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Abstract In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous
decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose
between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are
aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a
proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the
actors.We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes
or no- are possible) leave room for “manipulability” (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus
a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with
the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary
voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.
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1 Introduction
In classical social choice models the inputs of either social welfare functions (Arrow
1963) or social decision functions (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975) are social pref-
erence profiles. As is well known, the seminal results established by these authors
are negative “impossibility” theorems. In particular, the Gibbard–Sattherwaite the-
orem shows that when more than two alternatives are at stake it may be ingenu-
ous to expect individuals to provide their actual preferences whatever the decision
mechanism in use may be. Perhaps for this reason most committees or decision-
making bodies use dichotomous voting rules, even in cases where they must often
face decisions more complex than just dichotomous choices. Moreover, in actual col-
lective decision-making individuals are most often not asked directly to report their
preferences.When collective decisions aremade bymeans of a voting rule, individuals
are offered a certain set of actions (e.g. voting yes or no, or perhaps also abstaining,
etc.) and each individual may choose her/his preferred action given her/his preferences
and whatever information s/he may have about other individuals.
In this paper, based on the model of quaternary voting rules provided in Laruelle
and Valenciano (2010), we address several issues related to collective dichotomous
decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules. That is, when voters may
choose between four actions—voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up—
which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or
rejection of a proposal. First, we further disentangle the concepts of decisiveness and
success, often conflated in voting power literature. The difference between these two
notions becomes apparent in the framework of quaternary voting rules. Decisiveness
depends only on the profile of actions, while success has to do with the voters’ pref-
erences. We relate these notions to that of manipulability in this context. It turns out
that the possibility of manipulation arises in spite of the dichotomous character of
decisions, as a result of the voters having more than two choices. We show the dif-
ficulty of extending the notions of success and decisiveness ex ante. Nevertheless, a
natural extension is possible when preferences are strict and common knowledge and
coordination between voters is feasible.
Among the most closely related literature the following may be mentioned:
Felsenthal andMachover (1997), Braham and Steffen (2002) and Pongou et al. (2010)
consider ternary rules where the three actions are voting yes, voting no and abstain-
ing. They define voters’ power in this context. Uleri (2002), Côrte-Real and Pereira
(2004), Herrera and Mattozzi (2010), Maniquet and Morelli (2010) and Pauly (2010)
deal with ternary rules where the third action is not participating. They study the stra-
tegic aspect induced by quorums. Côrte-Real and Pereira (2004) show that an agent
may be better off abstaining than voting for her/his preferred choice under a simple
majority with a participation quorum. The simple majority and the simple majority
123
SERIEs (2012) 3:15–28 17
with approval quorum do not cause this paradox, which they refer to as the “no-show
paradox”. Maniquet and Morelli (2010) confirm this finding. Dougherty and Edward
(2010) compare the simple majority and the absolute majority in quaternary rules, in
one case assuming that voters are sincere. Freixas and Zwicker (2003) study quater-
nary rules and more generally rules with many actions and possible outcomes. Their
model is however more specific as they only consider ordered actions. In particular
their rules never display any sort of no show paradox because of the linear order of
the actions. Tchantcho et al. (2010) study influence in this context.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews some basic
notions for binary rules as a term of reference. Section 3 summarizes the formalization
of quaternary voting rules. In the context of quaternary voting rules ex post success
and decisiveness are formulated in Sect. 4, while strategic issues are dealt with in
Sect. 5. Section 6 deals with the connection between preferences and outcomes, and
Sect. 7 addresses the ex ante extension of success and decisiveness.
2 Preferences and actions in binary rules
In this section we briefly review the simplest voting situations, where voters face a
dichotomous decision (acceptance or rejection of a proposal) according to the speci-
fications of a binary voting rule where two actions are allowed for each voter: voting
yes and voting no (see, e.g., Laruelle and Valenciano 2008).
If the number of voters is n, let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of labels used indiffer-
ently to label the seats or the voters occupying them. A vote configuration lists the
votes cast by the voters occupying each seat. So, we denote by the vote configuration
S = (SY , SN ) the result of a vote where SY is the set of yes-voters (i.e. the voters
who vote yes) and SN is the set of no-voters (i.e. the voters who vote no). For binary
rules we have SN = N \SY , thus there are 2n possible vote configurations and each
configuration can be represented by the set of yes-voters SY . A binary voting rule
V specifies which vote configurations lead to the acceptance of a proposal. A vote
configuration is yes-winning if SY ∈ V , and no-winning if SY /∈ V . In order to discard
inconsistent rules V is usually assumed to satisfy the following conditions: (i) N ∈ V
(a unanimous yes implies acceptance); (ii) ∅ /∈ V (a unanimous no entails rejection);
(iii) if SY ∈ V , then T Y ∈ V whenever SY ⊆ T Y (monotonicity: if a vote configu-
ration is yes-winning, then any other configuration with a wider set of yes-voters is
also yes-winning); (iv) if SY ∈ V then N \SY /∈ V (the possibility of a proposal and
its negation both being accepted should be prevented).
Ex post success or satisfaction is usually defined as the correspondence between
the final result and the voter’s vote. After a decision is made according to a binary
voting rule V , if the resulting vote profile is SY voter i is said to have been successful
iff
(i ∈ SY ∈ V) or (i /∈ SY /∈ V). (1)
A voter is said to have been decisive if her/his vote was crucial for the final outcome;
that is, had s/he changed her/his vote the outcome would have been different.
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Definition 1 In a binary voting rule V , voter i is decisive in a vote configuration SY
if1
[(i ∈ SY ∈ V) and (SY \ i /∈ V)] or [(i /∈ SY /∈ V) and (SY ∪ i ∈ V)]. (2)
Note that a yes-voter can only be decisive for the acceptance of the proposal (which
we will refer to as yes-decisiveness), while a no-voter can only be decisive for the
rejection of the proposal (which we will refer to as no-decisiveness). This is a con-
sequence of the monotonicity condition. Therefore being successful is a necessary
condition for being decisive. A voter is decisive in a vote if her/his vote is crucial for
her/his success.
These notions can be extended ex ante (Laruelle and Valenciano 2005) if it is
assumed that for any action profile SY that may arise the probability p(SY ) of voters
voting in such a way that SY emerges is known. That is, p(SY ) gives the probability
that voters in SY will vote yes, and those in N \SY will vote no. The ex ante version





SY :i /∈SY /∈V
p(SY ), (3)






SY :i /∈SY /∈V
SY ∪i∈V
p(SY ). (4)
In the preceding formulations, the distinction between preferences and actions is
not explicit. Two implicit assumptions underlie the statements and definitions there:
Preferences are strict, i.e., no voter is indifferent between acceptance and rejection
of a proposal, and voters vote according to their preferences, i.e. yes (no) iff they
prefer the proposal to be accepted (rejected). We now examine this more carefully
and revise the notions of success and decisiveness, clarifying the distinction between
actions and preferences. A vote configuration S = (SY , SN ) is an action profile as it
lists the action (yes or no) chosen by each voter.
In general, a voter may be in any of three different positions for a given proposal:
A voter is a supporter (rejecter) if s/he is in favor of the acceptance (rejection) of the
proposal, otherwise we say that the voter is indifferent. Let P+ ⊆ N denote the set
of supporters, P0 the set of indifferent voters, and P− the set of rejecters. The voters’
preferences can be represented by a 3-partition P = (P+, P0, P−) ofN that we refer
to as a preference profile. A preference profile is strict if no one is indifferent, that is,
P0 = ∅.
A supporter (rejecter) is said to vote sincerely if s/he votes yes (no). As to indifferent
voters, the weakest assumption about them is the indeterminacy of their behavior. So
a sincere action profile is defined as follows:
1 We write SY \ i and SY ∪ i instead of SY \ {i} or SY ∪ {i} consistently to simplify notation.
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Definition 2 An action profile S is sincere w.r.t. a preference profile P = (P+,
P0, P−) ∈ 3N , if P+ ⊆ SY and P− ⊆ SN .
While in general there is more than one sincere action profile, for strict preferences
(P0 = ∅) there is only one: SY = P+ and SN = P−.
Making explicit the difference between preferences and actions permits us to rede-
fine more properly the notion of success. If being successful ex post means obtaining
the preferred outcome, it should be stated as follows.
Definition 3 In a binary rule V , with preference profile P , voter i is successful in the
vote configuration SY if the decision coincides with i’s preference, that is, iff
(i ∈ P+ and SY ∈ V) or (i ∈ P− and SY /∈ V). (5)
This definition is equivalent to (1) when SY = P+ and SN = P−. That is, when
the preferences are strict and voters vote sincerely. Although in general sincere and
rational behavior may not coincide, themonotonicity condition guarantees that sincere
voting is always rational in the context of dichotomous binary rules. This is a corollary
of the following
Proposition 1 Given a binary voting rule V , for any preference profile P, a voter
who is not successful in the vote configuration P+ will not be successful by changing
her/his vote.
Proof Consider first a supporter i . If i ∈ P+ is not successful in P+ it means that
P+ /∈ V . Then by monotonicity we have P+ \ i /∈ V and supporter i is not successful
in P+ \ i either. Similarly if i ∈ P− is not successful in P+ it means that P+ ∈ V .
Then by monotonicity we have P+ ∪ i ∈ V and rejecter i is not successful in P+ ∪ i
either. unionsq
In other words, as a rational voter’s objective is to be successful, sincere voting is
a weakly dominant strategy if the voter is decisive for at least one vote configuration.
In any case, a voter never has an incentive not to vote sincerely. As will be seen below,
for some quaternary voting rules a voter may have an incentive to vote strategically
rather than sincerely. When a voter is not successful in a sincere vote configuration,
but may be successful if s/he unilaterally changes her/his vote, we say that the sin-
cere vote configuration is manipulable by that voter. This concept can be extended to
groups of voters. If a group of voters with the same preference could be successful
by jointly changing their sincere vote, we would say that the corresponding sincere
vote is manipulable by the group of voters. This is also impossible in the context of
binary voting rules because of monotonicity. We then have the following definition
and result:
Definition 4 Avoting rule is notmanipulable if no sincere vote configuration ismanip-
ulable by a group of voters whatever the preference profile P.
Proposition 2 No binary voting rule is manipulable.
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Thus, assuming strict preferences, vote configurations follow immediately from
preference profiles and, as (1) is then equivalent to (5), we can define the notion of
success on the basis of action profiles. But in general the notion of success also depends
on preference profiles as the definition of success shows. By contrast, decisiveness
is the capability to reverse the final outcome. The definition depends on the action
profile as can be seen from (2).
3 Quaternary voting rules
Now we consider the case where dichotomous decisions (acceptance or rejection
of proposals) are made by means of a quaternary voting rule, where four possible
actions are allowed for each voter: voting yes (Y ), abstaining (A), staying home (H )
and voting no (N ). The actions chosen by all voters can be represented by a 4-partition
S = (SY , S A, SH , SN ) of N , where SY is the set of yes-voters, S A the set of abstain-
ers, SH the set of those who stay at home and SN the set of no-voters. We refer to S
as an action profile and denote by 4N the set of all such action profiles. A quaternary
voting rule W specifies which action profiles lead to the acceptance of a proposal:
W =
{
(SY , S A, SH , SN ) ∈ 4N : S leads to the acceptance of the proposal
}
.
We say that an action profile S is yes-winning if S ∈ W , and no-winning if S /∈ W .
A set Q ⊆ N is yes-enforcing if for all S ∈ 4N such that SY ⊇ Q we have S ∈ W .
A set Q ⊆ N is no-enforcing if for all S ∈ 4N such that SN ⊇ Q we have S /∈ W .
A quaternary voting rule is anonymous if only the number of voters who have
chosen each of the different options matters, not their identities. Anonymous rules
can be specified in terms of the number of voters who choose each option. In other
words whether an action profile is yes-winning or no-winning only depends on vector
(sY , s A, s H , s N ), where sY is the number of yes-voters, s A is the number of abstaining
voters, etc.
Given any two options B, C ∈ {Y, A, H, N }, a quaternary voting rule is BC-
monotonic if the following condition is satisfied: if the set of C -voters is exclusively
extended at the expense of the set of D-voters a yes-winning action profile does not
become no-winning. Formally, if S ∈ W , then T ∈ W for any T such that SC ⊆ T C
and SD = T D for D ∈ {Y, A, H, N } \ {B, C}.
Following Laruelle and Valenciano (2010), we propose the following conditions
for W to specify a sound voting rule: Full-support: if all voters vote yes the pro-
posal is accepted: SY = N ⇒ S ∈ W; Null-support2: if no voter votes yes the
proposal is rejected: SY = ∅ ⇒ S /∈ W. In addition to these, we assume AY -
monotonicity, NY -monotonicity, HY -monotonicity, and N A-monotonicity. But note
2 In Laruelle and Valenciano (2010) this condition is replaced by a weaker one (“weak null-support” ) in
order to cover rules that isolated would not be reasonable, but when intersected with others yield reasonable
ones that always satisfy null-support condition. As here we are concerned with actual decision rules, we
assume this stronger condition without loss of generality.
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that NY -monotonicity is implied by AY -monotonicity together with N A-monoto-
nicity. A voting rule is thus defined on the basis on the three minimal monotonici-
ties:
Definition 5 A “quaternary dichotomous voting rule” is a set W of 4-partitions of N
that satisfies full-support, null-support, N A-monotonicity, AY -monotonicity and HY
-monotonicity.
Themonotonicity conditions can be summarized by the following diagramwhere an
arrow indicates the transition of action that does not change the yes-winning character







Other reasonablemonotonicities can also be found in real-world examples (Laruelle
and Valenciano 2011). In some cases the options of staying at home and voting no
can be compared in terms of being more or less preferable for the acceptance or
rejection of the proposal. In this case, in all examples we have found, staying at
home is at least as favorable to acceptance as voting no, in other words we have
N H -monotonicity. The possible comparison of abstaining and staying at home may
result in one of the options being better than the other. So we can have either AH -
monotonicity or H A-monotonicity, but it may also be the case that these two options
cannot be distinguished in terms of their effects on the final result. In this case we
say that the two options are equivalent. Considering the different combinations of
monotonicities and equivalences, we obtain six sub-classes of monotonic quaternary






































A ≡ H ≡ N
(f)
(7)
3 Namely, (a) and (b) are (4, 2)-voting rules, (c), (d) and (e) are essentially (3, 2)-voting rules, and those
in (f) are essentially (2, 2)-voting rules. Subclasses (c) and (d) correspond to the ternary rules considered
by Felsenthal and Machover (1997).
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The three following subclasses contain rules where some options cannot be compared















A ≡ N H
(i)
(8)
Sub-class (i) is the class of rules studiedbyCôrte-Real andPereira (2004) andManiquet
and Morelli (2010).
4 Decisiveness and success
We now examine the notions of decisiveness and success for quaternary voting rules.
We distinguish between yes-decisiveness, when a voter can turn acceptance into rejec-
tion, and no-decisiveness, when a voter can turn rejection into acceptance. In a binary
rule a yes-voter (and only a yes-voter) can only be yes-decisive, while a no-voter (and
only a no-voter) can only be no-decisive. This is no longer the case in the context of
quaternary voting rules, as can be illustrated in the following rule:
Example 1 LetW be a majority of present voters with a quorum of 75%, with n = 11:
W =
{
(sY , s A, s H , s N ) : sY > s A + s N and s H < 4
}
.
In the action profile (5, 2, 3, 1) ∈ W any yes-voter, any abstainer and the no-voter
are yes-decisive (by staying home they would reverse the decision). In the action pro-
file (4, 2, 3, 2) /∈ W any abstainer, any no-voter and any voter who stays at home is
no-decisive (by voting they would reverse the decision). Note also that now whatever
the action chosen by an individual s/hemay change her/his vote in three different ways.
The way may matter: in the action profile (5, 2, 3, 1) the no-voter turns acceptance
into rejection only if the change is to staying at home.
In the sequel we use the following notation: If Q ⊆ N we denote
S−Q := (SY \ Q, S A \ Q, SH \ Q, SN \ Q),
and when Q consists of a single individual, i.e. Q = {i}, we write S−i . Then a voter
i is decisive in an action profile S if there exists another action profile T such that
T−i = S−i where S and T lead to different final outcomes.
Definition 6 For a quaternary voting rule W a voter i is yes-decisive in the action
profile S ∈ W if there exists T /∈ W such that T−i = S−i ; and a voter i is no-decisive
in the action profile S /∈ W if there exists T ∈ W such that T−i = S−i .
4 Classess (a)–(i) are some of these classes preordered by inclusion. Thus, it should be taken into account
that, for instance, (c) is contained in (a) and (b), and (f) in all the others.
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In the example above there is no action profile where a yes-voter is no-decisive,
while it may be the case that a no-voter is yes-decisive. As the following proposition
shows, the first fact is a general result, while the second is ruled out if the rule is
N H -monotonic.
Proposition 3 For any quaternary voting rule W , (i) a yes-voter is never no-decisive;
(ii) if W is N H-monotonic then a no-voter is never yes-decisive.
Proof Let S be an action profile. (i) If i ∈ SY and S /∈ W then all T such that
T−i = S−i and T A = S A ∪ i will also be no-winning by the AY -monotonicity dis-
played by any W . Similarly, by HY -monotonicity and NY -monotonicity all T such
that T−i = S−i are no-winning. (ii) A similar argument applies to all no-voters if W
is N H -monotonic. unionsq
Let us now focus on success. As for binary rules, being successful means obtaining
one’s preferred outcome. As with binary rules, success is defined only for supporters
or rejecters.
Definition 7 In a voting rule W , with preference profile P , voter i is successful in the
action profile S if the decision coincides with i’s preference, that is, iff
(i ∈ P+ and S ∈ W) or (i ∈ P− and S /∈ W).
5 Strategic voting or manipulation
When decisions are made by means of binary rules actions immediately follow strict
preferences and no sincere action profile is manipulable by a group of supporters or
of rejecters. Things become more complicated with quaternary voting rules. Recall
(see Definition 2) that an action profile S is sincere w.r.t. a preference profile P if
P+ ⊆ SY and P− ⊆ SN . The monotonicity conditions guarantee that sincere voting
is a rational behavior for supporters. More precisely, we have the following result.
Proposition 4 For any quaternary voting rule W and any preference profile P, a
supporter i who is not successful in the sincere action profile S is not successful either
in any T where T−i = S−i .
Proof For a supporter i who votes sincerely, we have i ∈ P+ and i ∈ SY . Voter i not
being successful means that S /∈ W . By Proposition 3 a yes-voter is never no-decisive.
In other words, for whatever T where T−i = S−i we have T /∈ W . unionsq
Thus, for a rational supporter whose objective is to be successful, sincere voting is
a weakly dominant strategy as far as s/he is decisive for at least one vote configuration.
This can be extended to groups of supporters. We have the following definition and
result:
Definition 8 Given a voting rule W and a preference profile P , a sincere no-winning
(yes-winning) action profile S /∈ W (S ∈ W) is manipulable by a group of supporters
(rejecters) Q if there exists T ∈ W (T /∈ W) such that T−Q = S−Q .
123
24 SERIEs (2012) 3:15–28
Proposition 5 Whatever the quaternary voting rule W , whatever the preference pro-
file P, no sincere action profile is manipulable by a group of supporters.
Proof Let S be a vote configuration and Q a group of supporters who vote sincerely,
i.e. Q ⊂ P+ and Q ⊂ SY . Either supporters are successful and have no incentive to
manipulate or they are not successful and S /∈ W . But then all T such that T−Q = S−Q
will also be no-winning by the monotonicities displayed by any W . Thus, supporters
are not successful in T either. unionsq
By contrast, sincere voting is no longer a weakly dominant strategy for a rejecter
whose objective is to be successful: a rejecter may be unsuccessful when s/he votes
no, and successful if s/he stays at home. In Example 1, consider a preference profile
with 5 supporters, 1 rejecter, and 5 indifferent voters. We have that (5, 2, 3, 1) ∈ W
is a sincere profile. In this action profile the rejecter and no-voter is not successful but
is yes-decisive, as (5, 2, 4, 0) /∈ W . This sincere action profile is manipulable by the
rejecter.
A voting rule is not manipulable if no sincere action profile is manipulable by a
group of supporters nor by a group of rejecters whatever the preference profile P .
Given that no sincere action profile can be manipulated by a group of supporters or
by a group of rejecters if the rule is N H -monotonic, we have the following:
Proposition 6 If a quaternary voting rule W is N H-monotonic, then W is not manip-
ulable.
When the rule is N H -monotonic voting no is a weakly dominant strategy for reject-
ers as long as they are decisive for at least one vote configuration. This may however
not be the only weakly dominant strategy. For rejecters in subclasses (a)–(c) and (g)
voting no is always a weakly dominant strategy, in subclasses (d) voting no is equiv-
alent to stay at home and weakly dominates abstaining and voting yes, in subclass
(e) voting no is equivalent to abstaining and weakly dominates staying at home and
voting yes, in subclass (f) voting no is equivalent to stay at home and abstaining and
weakly dominates voting yes.
For rules which are not N H -monotonic5 only supporters are sure to vote sincerely,
while for some sincere action profiles rejecters may not be successful but are decisive.
This happens when the action profile is yes-winning and a rejecter is yes-decisive
because by choosing to stay at home instead of voting no s/he may change the result.
This possibility is ruled out if the set of supporters can guarantee the acceptance of
the proposal by itself. Thus we have an obvious conclusion:
Proposition 7 If the preference profile P is such that P+ is yes-enforcing in the qua-
ternary voting rule W , then no sincere action profile is manipulable by a group of
rejecters.
5 That is to say, rules in the general class or in classes (h)–(i) which are not contained in any smaller class
(see footnote 3).
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6 Preferences and final outcome
By contrast with binary rules, when decisions are made by means of a quaternary rule
it may be the case that the action profile and consequently the outcome are not fully
determined, even when the preference profile is strict. As will be seen presently, this
may critically depend on information and/or the possibility of coordination.
When decisions are made by means of a quaternary rule sincere voting is always a
weakly dominant strategy for supporters. Thus if P+ is yes-enforcing, the final out-
come is sure to be the acceptance of the proposal. For rejecters, sincere voting is a
weakly dominant strategy only if the rule is N H -monotonic. Thus if P− is no-enforc-
ing and the rule is N H -monotonic the final outcome is sure to be the rejection of the
proposal. But if the rule is not N H -monotonic the final outcome is not necessarily the
rejection of the proposal, even if P− is no-enforcing. Indeed, if the preference profile
is not common knowledge and/or coordination is not possible rejecters may not have
a dominant strategy. Consider again Example 1, where n = 11 and
W =
{
S ∈ 4N : sY > s A + s N and s H < 4
}
.
As the rule is anonymous, we will only need the numbers of supporters (p+), indif-
ferent voters (p0) and rejecters (p−), and we summarize the preference profile by
the vector (p+, p0, p−). With only this information about the rule, rejecters cannot
choose a weakly dominant strategy, even if the preference profile is such that P−
is no-enforcing. Now let us examine the case where the preference profile is com-
mon knowledge. This knowledge does not influence the behavior of supporters: they
will still vote yes, but for rejecters knowledge of the preference profile may or may
not be enough for them to choose an optimal action taking into account the action
of the supporters. In some cases an equilibrium can be obtained by elimination of
dominated strategies. Assume that the preference profile (p+, p0, p−) = (7, 0, 4) is
commonly known. Knowing that the 7 supporters vote ‘yes’ (and thus eliminating the
other options for these supporters) the weakly dominant strategy for rejecters is to stay
at home. Indeed the only no-winning vote profile where sY = 7 is when s H = 4. If the
preference profile is (p+, p0, p−) = (6, 0, 5), the same argument applies: knowing
that sY = 6 (and thus eliminating the other options for these supporters) the weak
dominant strategy for the rejecters is staying at home. Here there is more than one
no-winning profile with sY = 6 but the option of staying at home is always as good
as voting ‘no’ and in one case (when s H = 3 and s N = 2) it is strictly better to stay
home than to vote no. Interestingly enough, if (p+, p0, p−) = (5, 0, 6) the option
of staying at home no longer dominates any more voting no, and nor does voting no
dominate staying at home. Here rejecters will have a problem of coordination, even if
the subset of rejecters is no-enforcing.
Finally if coordination is possible between voters with identical preferences, the
final outcome will be the acceptance of the proposal if P+ is yes-enforcing and the
rejection of the proposal if P− is no-enforcing, or if the group of rejecters can coor-
dinate in such a way that they obtain the rejection of the proposal. Otherwise it will
depend on how the indifferent voters vote.
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It can be concluded that information about the preferences and the possibility of
coordination favor rejecters, while the less the information and the greater the difficulty
of coordinating the better for supporters.
7 Success and decisiveness ex ante
The extension of the notions of decisiveness and success ex ante to the context of
quaternary voting rules comes up against several difficulties. In the context of binary
rules, assuming strict preferences and rational voters, the vote profile is determined
and identical to the preference profile. Thus, each probability distribution on prefer-
ence profiles determines a probability distribution on voting profiles. In this way the
probability of each individual being successful or decisive can be calculated for any
binary rule. Now, when four options are available to voters even a strict preference
profile does not always determine a rational action profile: supporters will vote yes, but
rational rejecters, unless the rule is N H -monotonic, may not have a weakly dominant
strategy. However, this difficulty disappears when preferences are common knowl-
edge and coordination is possible. Under these conditions, if the preference profile is
P (with P0 = ∅) then the action profile would be an S s.t. S+ = P+, and if S+ is
yes-enforcing the result will be acceptance, otherwise rejecters would coordinate and
have the proposal rejected. Thus, in practical terms, under these conditions it is as if
the actual rule were the binary rule given by
V(W) = {S ⊆ N : S is yes-enforcing} .
This is in fact the core binary rule associated with W (see Laruelle and Valenciano
2010). Thus, assuming strict preferences, a consistent way of calculating the ex ante
success of a voter based on an estimate p (i.e. a probability distribution over strict
preference profiles) would be by means of (3), where p(SY ) is to be replaced by
p(P+ = SY ). Similarly, ex ante decisiveness can be calculated by means of (4).
It isworth noting that a direct approach to decisiveness based on actual 4 -action pro-
files encounters conceptual difficulties. Consider Example 1 once more. Assume the
preference profile (p+, p0, p−) = (5, 0, 6). If coordination is possible rejecters may
coordinate their actions so that any of the following action profiles result (among oth-
ers, assuming supporters play their dominant strategy): (sY , s A, s H , s N ) = (5, 0, 0, 6)
or (5, 0, 1, 5) or (5, 1, 0, 5) or (5, 2, 0, 4) or (5, 1, 1, 4) or (5, 3, 0, 3) or (5, 2, 1, 3) or
(5, 4, 0, 2) or (5, 3, 1, 2) or (5, 0, 4, 2) or (5, 1, 4, 1) or (5, 2, 4, 0) or even (7, 0, 4, 0).
Rational rejecters looking for success would be indifferent between these 13 possible
ways of coordinating their actions as in all cases the proposal would be rejected. As
the reader may check, these profiles are completely different from the point of view
of which rejecters are decisive and which are not in each of them. But why should
a rational rejecter interested in a successful rejection care about these differences?
These irrelevant differences are disregarded by the proposed approach based on the
underlying core rule that ignores them.Moreover, there is no convincing way to derive
a probability distribution over 4-action profiles based on a probability over preference
profiles.
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The suggested approach also ignores the possibility of indifferent voters, but this
is also the case in the traditional approach for binary rules (where often abstention is
counted as a no). What can reasonably be assumed about the behavior of indifferent
voters? Felsenthal andMachover (1997), in the context of ternary voting rules, assum-
ing that indifferent voters abstain, assume that the probability of a voter choosing
any of the three actions (yes, no, abstention) is 1/3. Is this reasonable? Then why not
assume the same for binary rules which might actually result in voting yes with prob-
ability 1/3 and no with probability 2/3? Their rather ad hoc assumption pointed to the
extension of Banzhaf–Penrose index, an a priori evaluation of decisiveness interpreted
as a measure of “voting power”. In our opinion (see Laruelle and Valenciano 2008),
unless one form or another of bargaining precedes decisions, the very notion of voting
power merely based on the likelihood of being decisive is conceptually inconsistent.
Finally, there remains the casewhere preferences are not commonknowledge and/or
coordination is not possible. In this case ex ante evaluation of success by means of
the core rule would not be realistic in general. It would provide a low or pessimis-
tic evaluation for supporters, because the calculation based on the core rule assumes
that rejecters can always do their best for their interest. At least it can be seen as a
reasonable lower bound calculated on well specified conditions.
8 Conclusion
Dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules provides a con-
text where the distinction between preferences and actions is obvious and necessary.
This distinction permits the difference between success and decisiveness to be stressed
again (if necessary). Success relates preferences and the final outcome, while deci-
siveness relates actions and the final outcome. This distinction also questions some
extensions in the literature on power indices. If a distribution of probability is assumed,
it should be on the preferences and not on actions. Indeed the choice of actions may
be strategic and depends on the rule.
This paper suggests the following issues that need to be addressed. First, if we
assume that the rule maximizes the sum of utilities, we can infer from the choice of
the quorum/quota the implicit assumption which is made about the relation between
preferences and actions. So the question is: what assumption on the agents behavior
justifies a certain quorum? Second, can wemake comparisons in terms of how a voting
rule will fit best the average success of a voter?When there are two alternatives to vote
on, the rule that maximizes the probability of a voter getting the outcome s/he favors
is the simple majority. Can we extend results of this kind to more general rules?
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
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